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Largely this paper depends directly on what I learned and listened to during the conference whose1
proceedings the volume contains. I had the luck of speaking towards the end of Mind & World, Durban 2003. I
am grateful to all who were there. I learned much from them. Thanks to David Spurrett for the organisation, the
environment, and the hospitality provided in all sorts of ways, cognitive and non. Some of the ideas here have
been considerably sharpened and improved by my listening to friends and colleagues at the Friday afternoon
cognitive meeting, taking place in Durban every week. I apologize if the tone of the paper is very philosophical
and will be somewhat obscure to professional linguists. However I am of the view that the philosophy of
language and linguistics, integrational and not, will greatly benefit seeing itself in  a larger context of scientific
comprehension of minds. 
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Abstract:
A distinction between language and communication is drawn. Some general consequences follow for
the study of cognition, deflating to a large extent the controversial aspects of research program n
contemporary linguistics. The byproduct turns out to be that we do not have to solve general problems
of intentionality in the study of the mind.
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Tradition singles out language as solely human. For a long time almost all believed humans to be the
only language users. Now we are in a different position.  There is empirical evidence to the effect that1
non human animals communicate. We have, more controversially, evidence that some species
(probably only some of the great apes) possess some faculty that many do not hesitate to call
language. I entertain some skepticism about such claims. Skepticism is however not a theory, much
less a doctrine. I set myself the task of drawing a distinction, in a spirit of cooperation with all
interested parties.
A naturalistic attitude, whichever the details of one’s naturalism, tries to see as little as possible
sundry in reality. Eschewing plainly religious positions, there is nothing particular about humans to
make them the chosen ones. Hence it is a good methodological position to look for as much
similarities, gradual transitions, progressive adaptions, and what have you, between the non human
creatures and humans. I take non human creatures, for the purpose at hand, to include human infants,
infants being exactly infants: people who do not speak. And here we find indeed much to learn from
the study of animal and even robotic communication. In the words of the late Cole Porter,
“sentimental centipedes do it”, and we found a plethora of cases in which all sorts of organisms, one
way or another, are able to transfer information by a variety of means. Monkeys’ and birds’ calls,
bees’ dances, and whales’ songs are abundant reason to think that communication is:
(i) not particularly depending on what philosophers call intentionality (an ability to refer)
and
(ii) not particularly dependent either upon the specifics of the human language faculty (we
have no reason to think that even the best trained ape gets anywhere close to the size of the
lexical repertoires of a 10 year old human, even less reason to believe our simian colleagues
acquired an argument structure for verbs.) 
Even assuming I am wholly wrong about animal language skills, I take it to be a plain fact that there
is animal communication and that if there is an animal language, this is achieved via painful training
while the triggering of the language faculty in humans is virtually effortless, automatic, and not
coached by any pedagogical strain. To check this, consider the simple case of acquisition of argument
(slots to be filled conceptually at the very least) for verbs: who has been taught that “give” has a giver,
a givee, and a given?
Were this the end of the story our fretting souls would be placated: we just made a mistake stranded
by Descartes. It was credible, after him, that anything that would come to resemble languages if
produced by non humans would have been parroting in the strict sense. It would, to use the standard
locution, make no sense. Literally it would be noise produced imitating blindly other noise. Alas this
is not the case. The monkey alerting her fellow monkeys that the predator is near is not parroting
anything. It is making a noise to inform, warn, guide, and so forth. Ditto for the vagaries of what
exactly whales are telling each other, quite possibly just calling one another given that they move in
rather extended spaces. 
But, and here comes the rub and the centre of my paper, there remains a serious problem. While we
may agree that communication is a widespread phenomenon, human languages retain some puzzling
properties not found in all sorts of other communicative devices. Said properties have been and are
still perfectly visible to anybody. Natural languages are intricately structured entities, whose
structures cluster around a property which was the object of classic insights (from what we would
now call physics, linguistics is a young discipline.) The property is discrete infinity, seldom present in
nature. Perhaps the only other case of a discrete infinity system is the natural numbers, which despite
their name may be not part of nature after all.
. While the observations here appear to me uncontroversial, for a longer, neat recent2
expositions of the same points (in essence they go back to Panini, Galilei, and Newton) see
[4]
Discrete infinity is infinity because of the capacity of what has it to produce infinitely many sets of
objects by composing ad infinitum a finite set of building blocks. Discrete infinity is discrete because
of lack of continuity: there are all sorts of six, seven, seventy nine words sentences while absolutely
nothing is a 3.5 words sentence. Note that systems possessing discrete infinity have literally no upper
bound: nothing is the longest sentence of any particular language. Reminder: I am here looking at
abstract features of a faculty that is implemented by mind or brains, hired, used by all sorts of other
systems. It is quite possible that there is a practical upper bound to the length of a sentence.
Interestingly it is not set by the language faculty itself but by interacting systems and mechanisms
(memory, lungs, social interests, mortality, if the bound is set by the interpretation systems,
morphology and long distance anaphora power – this may truly vary from language to language,
German likes long sentences more than English, Mandarin even less.) Here it is noticeable that
discrete infinity is a property of S, the sequence of natural numbers. Again there is no largest number
and the sequence, itself not finite, is generated by finite means. The analogy is useful in that it
indicates that recursion is a crucial feature of the language faculty . The analogy is doubly useful2
because in both cases we can identify basic elements of the system. The recursive nature of the natural
numbers affords us axiomatic systems whose only basis is an arbitrary Ur-element (in the Peano
system, 0) and the successor function. Granted, it may not be so easy to identify what the bases of
language thus understood are, but that is no reason not to pursue the inquiry into bases and rules, with
an aim at generalizing and minimizing as much as possible. 
Trying to be faithful to a naturalistic inspiration, we want to look to non human species, as well as to
subsystems of what, informally, we take to be human minds. We look for systems, individuals,
species, and subsystem which are recursive. Note that the question is a purely empirical one, We have
a given property, fairly well identified. We even know, more or less, how to manufacture an artificial
device capable of computing recursive functions. The issue here is whether we have natural entities
with this property. Given commonsensical assumptions, human brains are one such natural items.
They are not alone in this though. It seems to me that the first sub-personal system that is recursive is
our counting faculty, which we share to a limited extent with some apes, and with far stupider
chickens. It may not be the only one though. We do have some evidence that navigational systems for
individuals that, presumably are dumber and dumber -such as some insects- are recursive in exactly
the right way. In a general sense, nothing in these systems seems to be cognitive, if cognition has to
do with knowledge. All these systems share a high level of automaticity. In the popular sense of the
terms they are instincts, nothing else. The first, partial conclusion that I draw from a distinction
between language and communication is that the human language faculty (LF) may have just nothing
. See e.g. Agueras et al.. See also by the same authors the (12.31.2002) “Computation in a3
single neuron: Hodgkin and Huxley revisited”, variously available on line, though anyone
interested can ask me for a file containing it or to {blaisea,fairhall,wbialek}@princeton.edu.
The authors develop a detailed analysis of the dynamical nature of inputs and reduction to
low dimensional spaces of the spiking of a single neuron.
unique. If recursivity is indeed constitutive of LF, then Descartes & Co. were somewhat misguided. It
may be very easy to build an artificial “speaker”. A GPS equipped wristwatch may be such a device,
while being utterly devoid of anything even vaguely akin to the wonderfully intricate universe
encountered in human communication. Note in passing that none of the considerations here adduced
bears on any purported mind-body problem. Recursive systems can be characterized in abstract ways
but we have no reason to doubt at present that neurons can implement something like one.  Nor there3
is an issue of consciousness. All the work can be done by sub-personal systems that need not come to
surface of awareness. Nor there is an issue of “freedom of the will”, a theme dear to Cartesians of all
stripes. We cannot compose a sentence in a natural language of 3.6 words. In a very real sense we are
not free to do it, while we retain absolute creative freedom, up to surrealist automatic poetry to
communicate and miscommunicate at will. A 3.6 words sentence fails to be a sentence: being very
optimistic it may be built in an artificial setting, pronounced and uttered. All interpretation will crash,
borrowing a term from contemporary computerese, quite like visual interpretation crashes if one looks
at some of Escher’s prints.
A provisional point can be made at this stage that speaks directly to the concerns of integrational
linguistics. If I am correct in identifying an essential property of the language faculty as its recursive
powers, we can ask meaningful empirical questions about it, abandoning the somewhat sterile diatribe
about what is innate and internal. My own view is that we can and do find recursion, more or less
along lines that can be modelled by mathematical (and very simple) tools, in all sorts of non human
organisms and in all sorts of very, very sub-personal systems. It is, e.g., an empirical question whether
negation can be acquired or comes with the pre-packaged human system. So far as I understand apes’
language they neither have nor have acquired a simple recursive rule humans apply all the time, viz.
{when, if... 8 is a sentence, [not 8] is a sentence}. It would be an extremely interesting discovery, an
empirical discovery, to find out that Kanzi or someone else acquired such a rule. If I stress the
empirical, it is only because I see no a priori argument of any kind that might settle such a question. It
remains a fact, I take it, that humans have/use/are born with (?)/acquire with extreme ease such a rule.
None the less, if it were to be found that, say, the great simian brothers of ours, can use “not”, we
would have a further additional piece of evidence for the presence of recursion in non human systems,
with the bonus of the discovery that it is learnable via explicit training. We would remain with the
small mystery of the mechanisms of the triggering in humans, since we do know even now that there
is little if any explicit learning of rules like negation. Whether or not the narrowly conceived language
. See Block, 20034
faculty is purely a set of recursive rules which interfaces with other systems in the mind is no doubt an
empirical question. The issue here is descriptive adequacy: we need to show that the large family of
natural languages is describable by the proper set of rules, no doubt interacting with the lexicon. In a
nutshell, for those who like technical language, what I suggest is that from the standpoint of cognitive
science the chief task for language studies is to show that morphology is irrelevant, largely an artefact
of the way we describe language, but nothing fundamental at all. For anyone confronted with the
daunting appearance of the quasi zero morphology of Mandarin and the luxurious morphology of
Latin, I trust it is clear enough that no a priori argument can show any of this. Much of what we take
to be morphology is random noise: a watch is a female in French, a male in Italian, neither in English.
One hopes that nothing fundamental hangs on these superficial differences, maddening as they are if
one is faced with a normative grammarian. What needs to be shown is what lies behind the surface, as
quite traditionally in any scientific enquiry. The wonder of comets has to be replaced, more
geometrico, by celestial mechanics. The shock of languages where word order does not matter and of
languages where it is crucial has to be replaced by the setting of an ordering parameter, triggered by
development. Cowley [this volume] correctly stress how important can be the difference between
[gondada] and [dadagon]. The challenge as I see it is to show that such a feature is superficial in the
sense that it is one of the possible ways of implementing a conceptual distinction and the job could be
done in a variety of ways.
If the story were to finish here, we would face “only” a plain vanilla scientific problem: how to reduce
the visible complexity of some set of phenomena to a simple, preferably small, set of rules, if possible
mathematically tractable. Were that the case, we would just have to take on the divine madness of Sir
Newton and look at language with the same tools he used for tides and comets. 
This is not correct, witness the massive confusion found for the last two dozen decades in language
studies. Many, if not most, in the philosophical community take the stance that language is virtually
the only subject matter in which we can apply commonsense methods: dogs are dogs, so ‘dogs’ means
dogs, on the basis of the assumption that we know what meanings are. We don’t. We have a perfectly
fine folk-linguistics that is highly dualistic, full of mysterious entities, plenty of free will,
consciousness and related hard and harder problems.  The distinction around which this paper is built,4
between a narrowly conceived language faculty and a broad notion of language faculty at work in
communication is particularly relevant. A general maxim to heed in enquiry is that there is no science
of everything, and the study of communication is limning dangerously the study of everything minds
do. Even the fabled theory of everything in physics is not a theory of everything in this sense. Where
communication is involved we find easily people throwing around words like meaning,
comprehension, understanding, rationality, and even knowledge and culture. I am sceptical of such
approaches. Not because there is no communication. Nor because the phenomena are not of interest:
by and large we spend 90% of our mental efforts in communication of one sort or another. The reason
is far simpler and far more selfish in nature. My humble opinion is that we have virtually nothing to
gain from it. Science is a harsh master and does not reward the slaves with grand visions. Rather it
produces piecemeal understanding of limited scope: pretty as strings and branes are, they tell us
nothing of value about, say, symbolic systems. Likewise linguistics narrowly conceived offers a tiny
window of opportunity to understand what minds are (can be), virtually nothing worthwhile about the
ways in which said faculty is put to use. If, for instance, we look to narrow LF for a theory of dialogue
with predictive value, the results are slim to none. The best results gotten from narrow LF concern
judments of well-formedness. It is fairly visible, I suggest, that rather different modules are at work in
the implementation of language. I present a very simple classroom example. The surface structure and
semantics of these two sentences is the same:
(A) Can you swim?
(B) Can you pass the salt?
Yet virtually everyone takes (A) to be a yes/no question and (B) to be a more or less veiled
imperative. My question is about minds: how do we know the difference between (A) and (B)?
Knowing the distinction appears to be part of linguistic competence over and above any narrow
definition. It is indeed one of the ways in which we understand what an utterance means. It is not by
any stretch of imagination part and parcel of what I was suggesting can be characterized as our
language faculty in narrow terms. So we have to postulate that the narrow language faculty has two
properties: first it interfaces with other sectors of the mind, secondly it can be hired for service by
almost anything else. One minor terminological point: I just used mind and it is a spelling choice,
those who prefer brain can freely replace any occurrence. It is just too bad that our present neurology
does not have the resolution to watch, e.g., interfaces. One not so minor other point. I assume a
modular conception of mind, in the minimal sense that we can identify and conceptually isolate
faculties. Vision does not work like language, olfaction even less. For the imperialist
neurophilosophers this need not be a problem: it may very well be that the inquiry will find a single
unified neural mechanism that can physically implement all faculties. In which case we’ll know that
faculties as here conceived are abstractions, very much like the very same cellular mechanisms can
produce bones or livers. Back to non terminological issues. Interfacing is a condition the language
faculty has to meet because I take it to be self-evident that we can verbalize thoughts and at least some
component of thought is concepts, that are in themselves non linguistic. By the same token the
language faculty has to interface with a host of motion-control units in mouths, lips, fingers and so
forth. Fingers are there because of sign languages which display the same features of spoken
languages while lacking the phonological aspects. The language faculty can be hired because we have
reasons to think that infants are intelligently communicating before the onset of language use. I
surmise, as an empirical claim having nothing to do with innatism, that children adopt their language
faculty once in place and use it. Despite fascinating attempts to the contrary, I find it pretty unclear to
postulate an independent entity language that speaks us, as some fancy philosopher likes to claim.
Aside from these considerations, we have none the less to look also at a faculty of language broadly
conceived. The problem is daunting exactly because it borders with a science of everything minds do
and can do. Consciousness raises its ugly head because we communicate consciously more often than
not. Speech act are certainly intentional, and not in the philosophical sense: they intend to convey
specific meanings. “It is hot in here” (can) mean to convey the imperative to open the window. Two
sorts of considerations seem paramount in a naturalistic attempt to understand what the broad
language faculty does or is. The first is to try to reduce its supposed human uniqueness. The second is
to understand clearly how much of it can be reduced to mechanisms that require no miracles. Indeed if
there is a clear sense to naturalism in language studies it is to take it as a maxim aiming at avoiding
miracles. 
As for the first concern, I take it to be a given that non human animals and artefacts communicate. For
non human animals I think there is no doubt that we find ever more sophisticated forms of
communication among them, from signs of hostility expressed by grinding teeth to the apes’ calls that
are getting closer and closer to what we would recognize as linguistic behaviour. The extreme view,
taken by some, that Kanzi communicates with a language would terminally seal the debate. I do not
agree, since, I am told, to this day Kanzi has never mastered negation, something the recursive nature
of the human language faculty does at ease. I emphasize again that this is an empirical issue. Nothing
at all tells us a priori that, maybe with lots of training, an animal may develop something like LF. It
just seems to me that animals do not, on the available evidence. For artefacts the question is even
more intricate. On one side we have a conceptual issue. Persons communicate, not their language
faculties broad or narrow. Communication is in principle accessible to consciousness and it is
debatable whether any computer or the thing on which I type is conscious in any sense. On the other
there is a question of derived properties. Artefacts such as paintings or inscriptions do communicate
but it remains controversial whether the property is not wholly derived from their creators. I would
suggest that the only reasonable conclusion is that we know not enough about communication to
attribute it to artificial machines without further ado; though nothing in principle precludes the
production of independent communicating machines. Animals are machines of a very particular type,
products of evolution and not of human design, so I see no a priori argument to rule out that such
design could achieve what nature achieved blindly.
. As championed by D. Sperber and D. Wilson. See Sperber & Wilson, 19955
As for the second concern, only an approach aimed at minimizing miracles can be suggested. If it is
correct that the language faculty can interact with a conceptual/intentional system and with a motor
control, we have no principled reason not to think that it can interface as well with a host of other
systems that are not themselves linguistic. In spite of recent triumphalism over the issue, I surmise
that we are very far from a general topography of a mind, let alone a general theory. That said,
something can be said. 
Consider again the pragmatics examples above. To give but one example, relevance theory  subsumes5
with elegance, as well as with some difficulties, the interpretation of utterances under a general
minimax principle which is a form of optimizing behaviour. We communicate hiring our economic
faculty and a theory of other minds faculty. In short we take on board certain assumptions about
others being like us in trying to obtain maximal or optimal result from least efforts. We try ourselves
in communication to maximize results by lean and mean methods. An excellent example of this is
sarcasm, which aims precisely at shocking an audience and force it to reconsider a literal
interpretation of what one says. To produce one more example, take the well attested fact of
metaphor. We assume – we assume, language does nothing at all here other than providing lexicon
and syntax – that an audience’s interpretation modules take truth to be the default condition. If I say
that snow is white, the default assumption is that I want to say that snow is white. When I say that
Katerina empress of all Russias was a pig, I want my audience to balk at the notion that I am ignorant
enough to think of a porky descendant of the Czars. And I want them to go back along mental garden
paths to see that I want them to reject a literal interpretation and go around for some way of linking
what the concept of pig can tell them about my political opinions of the autocrat. Interestingly enough
similar mechanisms are at work when one uses obviously true sentences. “No man is an island” is
very true and yet the poet was forcing the audience to use an economic principle. It would not be
worthwhile to spend effort in communicating an obvious truth to people assumed to already know it.
The presumption at work (part of a theory of mind?) is that Donne would go to such length to say
something worthwhile. Intricate networks of this kind of mechanics are at work in communication.
All of them are interactions of different modules of the mind. Interestingly mechanisms such as these
are often below a conscious threshold. We can surmise they are relatively independent. Proofs in this
area are scant, but all dissociation pathologies at least suggest a relative degree of independence. We
have independent evidence, from developmental psychology, of the existence of a mental system that
attributes mental states to others very selectively. The existence in normal minds  of such a sub-
personal mental faculty is attested by the sad phenomenon of autistic people, who, at a minimum,
have great difficulty in making the right kind of distinction between their parents and their shoes. It
seems reasonable to postulate a relatively independent faculty that takes others of the right species to
.Note in passing that recent views, e.g. by N.A. Chomsky, on the perfection of the language faculty6
in meeting interface conditions are independent from what I say. Conceivably the language faculty,
being itself a natural product, may be designed less than optimally. Again all of this is independent on
the open issue whether language itself as humans possess it is an evolutionary effect of adaptation, or
a spandrel, or a side effect of constraints that have nothing to do with any of the above. Any option is
wholly compatible with a naturalistic understanding since even if language is not the result of
Darwinian adaptation, it is an accidental output derived from physical properties of the system.
. This is developed in tedious technical details in Palma, 2004. Technicalities therein are of7
interest solely to people with an interest in binding & anaphora, and/or to those who care
about indexicality.
be or have minds. Likewise much of what has been learned about normal development shows that
small children intially fail crucial tasks of attribution of mental states to others, and develop it without
any teaching at a threshold. I am here referring to the ‘false belief’ experiments, widely replicated. In
the same vein I cannot help but think, against many of my colleagues, that our beloved faculty of
being rational can be implemented by a mechanism of optimization in which the only inputs can be
preferences and output choices and behaviour. Strategies as basic as foraging in animals may display
such form of rationality with no need whichsoever to impute obscure animistic properties to them. If
some theorists are correct (see, e.g., the contribution by Don Ross, [this volume]) such rationality can
even be artificially implemented in computers simulating games. Rationality thus conceived is not
exhaustive of the folk notion of intelligent behaviour, it is however part of it. This does not exclude
the existence of areas of intelligent, purposive behaviour that are not rational in the sense of being
suboptimal. Neither it does exclude the very possibility that capturing theoretically minds, that is
intelligent behaviour, may entail non eliminable normative elements. It goes though some way
towards an integrated naturalistic understanding of mind. It is also to me evident that concepts,
whatever they ultimately are, are not linguistic in nature. Consider the simple fact that we have more
colour concepts than colour words. The level of discrimination of our perceptual system is not
matched by our lexicon. If in doubt, try to name shades of a particular wave length and there are
natural languages with fewer colour words than English. The language faculty with its lexical powers
is used by the conceptual system because of its expressive powers . Likewise anything we can achieve6
by communication whether rationally or not, is greatly facilitated by the use of language. Consider the
extreme difficulty involved in communicating what we get done with a relative clause by means of
gestures. The language faculty indeed provides even dummy “concepts” like indexical terms to name
on the fly, as it were, anything we care to call attention to . It is indeed useful to have the wherewithal7
to express thoughts, with all their creative and surprising aspects. The machinery though may have
nothing supernatural to it. It looks more like the usual array of gadgets that get a function once nature
finds a way along physical and morphological constraints. A small gadget like a recursive mechanism
gets used in an amazing way. It may be that in humans it is used for language, in insects for
navigation and who knows where else. The conceptual and intentional system gets to use it when and
. “And yet I know that rocks and similar bodies can make us hear not only sounds, like8
musical instruments, but also well articulated words.” Geraud de Cordemoy, Discours
Physique De La Parole , (first published in 1668, see Cordemoy, 1968, pp. 204 and ff.)
Immediately after the passage translated here, de Cordemoy goes on immediately to point out
that he knows that rocks do not speak, because they lack minds. His theory of mind module
takes over immediately to discern the truth of the matter, while his interpretation module –his
narrow LF– takes any noise as language.... For those who thought Cartesians were
outmoded...
how it finds it. In objects and organisms devoid of it, the system communicates, perhaps more
primitively without it. The pressure may be the same (conquest, flight, survival, better feeding
strategies or what have you) the surface effects very different. No species so far as it is known
developed a symbol making and using capacity akin to the human one. Addressing however our main
focus is still needed. It is apparent that I took an I-view of the language faculty. Narrow LF can be
described and studied in isolation, much as we can study gastrulation or bone formation. Language as
communication is however a social phenomenon. I am not sure whether it ought to be under the
philosophical rubric of externalism. Communication is, I suggest, better seen as relational in the direct
sense that more than one agent is involved. The remarks above though sketchy indicates a way to
destroy the supposed uniqueness and loneliness in nature of human communication. Communication
depends upon mechanisms that are shared by other species and narrow LF is based on properties
shared by systems that have nothing to do with communicating anything. The grain of truth of the
Cartesians’ intuitions that humans are unique lies in the strange, maybe accidental, combination of
both faculties in one and the same organism. Narrow LF includes an interpretive system that can take
anything as input: “Je connais encore que les rochers & d’autres corps semblables peuvent faire
entendre, non seulement des sons, comme les instruments de Musique, mais des paroles bien
articulées .” It is the job of other modules to take parsed, segmented, interpreted noise as a piece of8
language and together with yet other systems as communication. The process is not always smooth.
What interests me here is that we ought to see the language faculty in general as doubly relational.
The interface properties of narrow LF are relational because by itself it does literally nothing, much
like numbers by themselves do not count or perform multiplications. The relational properties of the
broad language faculty of communication are even more evident. Nothing could be done in
communication, much less successful transfers of information achieved, if the faculty itself were not
able to interact with all sorts of other mental modules, e.g. rationality, preference ordering, perception,
theory of mind, etc. Note that while it is speculative at this stage to say anything definite on the
subject, it may very well be that communication is relational also in the sense of requiring
conceptually more than one agent even to get off first base. This seems to me not evident since a mind
as popularly conceived may be far more distributed than we usually assume. We have no reason,
argues e.g. A. Clark, to take skin boundaries as the last frontiers. Memories can be jotted down and
people use cell phones as memory storage all the time. In the philosophical literature we encounter the
. By Ludwig Wittgenstein, or by Saul Aaron Kripke, or by the semi-fictional Kripkenstein9
who claims that it is not only impossible to have any language in isolation, but also to follow
any rule at all privately.
famous, or infamous, argument of the impossibility of a private language , which while very intricate9
seems to me to be precisely what we ought not to follow up in naturalistic enquiries, since it mixes
liberally normative and descriptive notions. Closer to my concerns are the considerations from
developmental psychology suggesting at least that infants severely deprived of parents, family,
community or what have you, appear to have missed the triggering at the right time that sets the thing
in motion. Cowley [this volume] argues, if I understand him correctly, that broad LF depends even
genetically from another mental module that is mimetic in essence. So it may very well be that broad
LF needs a social setting to develop, though once again nobody teaches anybody to be an optimizer in
the balance between efforts and desired results or to be relevant and to expect others to be relevance
maximizers.
Narrow LF does not make mistakes: it crashes when if it meets hurdles impossible to overcome. The
broad LF does not make mistakes: it may achieve very nasty results, when it takes bad inputs, badly
chosen preference orderings, ignores the utility built in in being polite, or to conform to one’s peer
group signalling strategies. We make mistakes since what we take to be persons are just intricate
networks of different modules each one of them is, hopefully, describable in purely descriptive terms.
The sum total of it all (a fabled theory of how the mind works)  may be so far beyond our present
capabilities that we are bound to construct philosophical theories about it even to be able to ask the
right questions. 
The perspective here taken is unabashedly naturalistic in that it tries to reduce minds to mechanisms.
It barely needs reminding that such perspective is limited in scope and narrow in its results. The price
to pay is high. If I am right we have to abandon much of the proud arrogant uniqueness and or
superiority of humans. Our wonderful languages are at bottom not much more intelligent than adding
machines. Our much prized ability to communicate may be not much smarter than computer programs
that fix the selling prices of derivatives in the stock market. 
What may be unique is the combination of a narrow language faculty and of a broad communication
faculty in one single system. Our modest contributions can only be at this stage to push mechanical
comprehension as far as it can go. Limits are likely to exist. Colin McGinn is fond of reminding
everyone that there is no reason to think that everything with regards to the mental is open to
understanding. The job at hand is to see where the limits actually are. My only conclusion is
extremely simple. We have no reason, when studying the mind, to get entangled in general theories
about intentionality, reference, or worse, culture and the like. Progress can be made along purely
empirical lines. 
How far naturalistic enquiry will go, time will tell.
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